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WHO'S AFRAID OF HENRY HART? 
Michael Wells* 
No law book has enjoyed greater acclaim from distinguished 
commentators over a sustained period than has Hart & Wechs-
ler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System.! Indeed, the 
praise seems to escalate from one edition to the next. Reviewing 
the first edition, published forty-three years ago, Philip Kurland 
called it "the definitive text on the subject of federal jurisdic-
tion."z Paul Mishkin added that "the analysis is of an order diffi-
cult to match anywhere."3 In his review of the second edition, 
published in 1973,4 Henry Monaghan began by praising the first 
for having "deservedly achieved a reputation that is extraordi-
nary among casebooks," and then continued: "[M]y view is that 
the second edition is at nearly every material point better than its 
predecessor."s When the third edition appeared in 1988,6 Akhil 
Amar called the first edition "beautiful and brilliant," and 
thought the third "better in many respects."? No doubt similar 
encomia will greet the recently published fourth edition.s Cer-
tainly the research is as thorough, the analysis as trenchant, and 
the questions as probing as ever. Hart & Wechsler continues to 
set the standard that other books must aspire to meet. 
Yet technical virtuosity and comparative merit are not the 
only tests by which a casebook may be judged. At the risk of 
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. The author wishes to thank Ann Alt-
house, Tom Eaton, Ron Ellington, Barry Friedman, Dan Meltzer, Richard Nagareda, 
Tom Rowe, David Seipp, and Larry Yackle for their helpful comments on a draft. 
1. Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal 
System (Foundation Press, 1953). 
2. Philip B. Kurland, Book Review, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 906, 907 (1954). 
3. Paul J. Mishkin, Book Review, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 776, 778 (1954). 
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tem (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1973). 
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tem (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 1988). 
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and the Federal System, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688,688 (1989). Amar appears to be less enthu-
siastic about the second edition. See id. at 710-11. 
8. Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's 
The Federal Courts and the Federal System (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 1996) ("Hart & 
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losing my union card in the Federal Courts workshop, I propose 
to show that the editors, through all four editions, are fundamen-
tally misguided in their approach to Federal Courts law. The 
main criteria for the selection and treatment of materials is a 
model of Federal Courts law elaborated by Henry Hart and Her-
bert Wechsler forty years ago, in the first edition, and called by 
one of the current editors the "Hart & Wechsler Paradigm. "9 
The editors' premise is that a casebook should follow the 
Supreme Court's treatment of the doctrinal problems, asking 
questions about such matters as the adequacy of the Court's ex-
planations, the implications of the Court's reasoning for the fu-
ture, and consistency among the cases. According to the Court, 
and Hart & Wechsler, Federal Courts law is mainly an effort to 
achieve such worthy aims as striving for finality, for efficiency in 
litigation, and for uniformity in federal law, assigning cases on 
the basis of institutional competence, minimizing friction be-
tween federal and state courts, and avoiding unnecessary consti-
tutional decisions. For the sake of convenience in exposition, I 
refer to this set of goals as "jurisdictional policy." 
Jurisdictional policy does help to explain and justify Federal 
Courts law, but it does not deserve the status Hart & Wechsler 
accords it. Focusing their attention on jurisdictional policy, the 
editors fail to develop the substantive themes that animate much 
of Federal Courts law. The Supreme Court and, less often, Con-
gress regularly set jurisdictional policy aside and employ Federal 
Courts law as a means of favoring one side or the other on the 
merits of the underlying litigation. For example, over the past 
two decades the Court has transformed federal habeas corpus by 
steadily chipping away at access to federal courts for state prison-
ers seeking to challenge their confinement on constitutional 
grounds.w While jurisdictional policies of promoting finality and 
respect for state procedures may help account for the Court's 
habeas cases, the Court's general substantive stand against broad 
constitutional rights of criminal procedure very likely influences 
these decisions as well. Though Hart & Wechsler mentions the 
political context of contemporary habeas law, the book contains 
not so much as a single note explicitly exploring the substantive 
theme, contenting itself with questions about the strength and 
9. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand. 
L. Rev. 953, 955-57 (1994); id. at 960 (noting that "the book retains an unmistakable 
continuity"). 
10. See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331, 
2355-2416 (1993); Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 Hastings L.J. 939 (1991). 
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implications of the jurisdictional policies advanced in the 
opinions.11 
Hart & Wechsler's neglect of substantive aims produces a 
distorted picture of what the Supreme Court and Congress do in 
Federal Courts cases, and why they do it. In addition, shunting 
aside substantive themes hampers any examination of the norma-
tive question of whether and how much substance ought to count 
for in Federal Courts law. The very success of the book exacer-
bates the problem. As one of the current editors puts it, Hart & 
Wechsler "defined the field as we now know it" and exercises 
"pervasive influence on Federal Courts teaching and scholar-
ship. "tz Other case books seek to imitate it, generally (according 
to casebook sales agents) by offering a "more teachable" version 
of Hart & Wechsler.13 Scholars accept its premises as the founda-
tion for their projects, often producing work that is not as incisive 
as it could be, simply because they do not grapple with all of the 
matters at stake in the cases. 
This article questions the methodology Hart & Wechsler, and 
Federal Courts scholars who follow its lead, use in addressing 
Federal Courts issues. Part I lays out the Hart & Wechsler model 
of Federal Courts law. Part II distinguishes naked substance from 
jurisdictional policy and traces the impact of substantive themes 
on jurisdictional doctrine. Part III finds fault with the fourth edi-
tion's treatment of substance. Part IV explains why these themes 
are given little systematic attention by this and other casebooks. 
Part V argues that the editors are wrong to deemphasize them. 
I. HART & WECHSLER'S FEDERAL COURTS LAW 
The worth and influence of a casebook depend largely on 
how much thought goes into the selection of materials. Anyone 
can gather cases bearing on a topic and assemble them in a 
bound volume. What is hard and valuable is to understand the 
area well enough to grasp its underlying structure. In this way a 
talented editor may abstract away from the mass of data and 
identify general normative and descriptive propositions that suc-
cessfully represent the doctrine and its underpinnings. The great 
strength of Hart & Wechsler is the sophisticated model of Federal 
11. See Hart & Wechsler Founh at 1373-1443 (cited in note 8). The discussion of the 
political context in which the Court has made habeas law, see, e.g., id. at 1360-61, is not 
the same thing as "substance," as I use the term. See text at notes 48-49, 84, 94. 
12. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 956 (cited in note 9). 
13. The plainest example is Peter W. Low and John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Federal 
Couns and the Law of Federal-State Relations (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 1994). 
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Courts law that underlies the materials. Richard Fallon, one of 
the editors of the fourth edition, calls the model the "Hart & 
Wechsler paradigm." The paradigm is never stated explicitly in 
the book itself, but is embedded in the choice of materials and 
the commentary on them. In describing it, I rely upon Fallon's 
article on the topic. 
As Fallon points out, the Hart & Wechsler paradigm is based 
on the theory of adjudication developed in the other great work 
Henry Hart produced in the 1950s, The Legal Process,l4 co-au-
thored with Albert Sacks.ls Some parts of the paradigm are 
Legal Process methodological precepts that apply to judicial de-
cision making in general, whether the issue comes from Federal 
Courts, property, workers' compensation, or any other area. 
These include, for example, the "anti-positivist principle" that 
law should be conceived as "a rich, fluid, and evolving set of 
norms ... not as a positivist system of fixed and determinate 
rules,"I6 and "the principle of reasoned elaboration," that "the 
judicial role ... is limited to the reasoned elaboration of princi-
ples and policies that are ultimately traceable to more democrati-
cally legitimate decisionmakers."I7 I have examined these parts 
of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm in earlier articles.1s 
Here I wish to take up the feature of the paradigm that 
bears most directly on Federal Courts law. This is the proposition 
that "questions of how decision-making authority should be allo-
cated are of foremost importance."I9 Accordingly, The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System defined the field of Federal Courts 
in terms of allocations of authority among the branches of the 
national government and between the national and state govem-
ments.zo The reason these questions of institutional design are so 
important lies in a proposition Hart and Sacks called "the princi-
ple of institutional settlement. "21 
14. Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making 
and Application of Law (Foundation Press, W. Eskridge and P. Frickey, eds. 1994). 
15. See Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 957-58, 961, 964-66 (cited in note 9). 
16. ld. at 965. 
17. ld. at 966. 
18. See Michael Wells, Busting the Hart & Wechsler Paradigm, 11 Const. Comm. 557 
(1995); Michael Wells, Positivism and Anti-Positivism in Federal Courts Law, 29 Ga. L. 
Rev. 655 (1995). 
19. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 964 (cited in note 9). 
20. ld. at 956. 
21. The materials were widely distributed, but remained unpublished until recently. 
Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process (cited in note 14). 
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A. INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT 
The principle of institutional settlement "expresses a judg-
ment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly 
established procedures ... ought to be accepted as binding on 
the whole society unless and until they are duly changed. "22 It 
would be a mistake to suppose that Hart and Sacks are merely 
stating the truism that we should obey the law. Dismissing insti-
tutional settlement in this way would seriously underappreciate 
its significance for Federal Courts law. Hart and Sacks call insti-
tutional settlement "the central idea of law," explaining that any 
society must provide for procedures to settle disputes about the 
content and application of law, whatever the substantive law may 
be.23 In a small society, the constitutive arrangements may be as 
simple as a single ruler or a council of elders, but "in a complex 
modern society, the questions demanding settlement are too nu-
merous" for such a solution. Moreover, in allocating these ques-
tions among governmental institutions, it is useful to keep in 
mind the varying competencies of courts, agencies, and legisla-
tures, for "different procedures and personnel invariably prove 
to be appropriate for deciding different kinds of questions,"24 
and the arrangements will vary from one society to another. 
Though institutional settlement has received little explicit at-
tention in Federal Courts scholarship, it is the central organizing 
principle of The Federal Courts and the Federal System.2s Fallon 
correctly points out that "it comes close to defining the Federal 
Courts field all by itself. "26 In our system of government, the 
powers to settle disputes are distributed among institutions by 
means of federalism, which divides decision-making among the 
national and state governments, and the separation of powers, 
which splits up the power of the national government among the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches.21 In order to work 
out the implications of the principle of institutional settlement in 
our system, we must ask questions about the institutional compe-
tence of courts compared with other branches of government, 
and of state versus federal courts, with the aim of seeing to it 
"that the principle of institutional settlement operates not merely 
22. ld. at 4. 
23. ld. 
24. ld. 
25. See Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 962, 964, 967 (cited in note 9). 
26. ld. at 967. 
27. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. 
L. Rev. 489, 490 (1954) (federalism and separation of powers are means of dividing up 
governmental power among a variety of institutions). 
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as a principle of necessity but as a principle of justice. "zs This 
task defines the scope of Federal Courts law, as conceived by 
Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler,29 and their successors down 
through the years have remained faithful to their conception of 
the area, even as they depart from the doctrinal positions staked 
out by the book's original editors. 
B. JuRISDICTIONAL PoLICIES 
Institutional settlement not only defines the field of Federal 
Courts for Hart & Wechsler; it also generates the framework of 
jurisdictional policies within which those issues should be re-
solved. For the sake of drawing the distinction, crucial to my ar-
gument, between jurisdictional policy and substance, it will be 
useful to describe briefly some of the major jurisdictional policies 
that guide the decision of Federal Courts cases under the Hart & 
Wechsler paradigm. Keep in mind that this is not a hornbook 
summary of black letter law. Some of these propositions are 
quite controversial, even among scholars who claim to share the 
Hart & Wechsler mantle. 
1. Institutional competence is a major consideration 
throughout the field. For example, in determining whether a 
given litigant has standing to raise an issue, courts following the 
Hart & Wechsler model ask whether the litigant has a sufficient 
personal stake to assure the adverseness needed for a full airing 
of the issues.3o If a dispute is brought to court before there is a 
sufficiently concrete issue to permit effective adjudication, it will 
be dismissed for lack of ripeness.31 Under the Pullman absten-
tion doctrine, unsettled state law issues should be left for the 
state courts, because only they may authoritatively resolve 
them.32 In the same vein, the Supreme Court should not under-
take to review state court decisions that rest on adequate and 
independent state law grounds.33 Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins34 establishes that ordinary common law rules are 
within the competence of state courts, so that federal courts may 
not go their own way on such matters. 
28. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at 6 (cited in note 14). 
29. See Hart, 54 Colum. L. Rev. at 489-91 (cited in note 27) (describing the 
problems of institutional settlement in our federal system). 
30. E.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
31. E.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
32. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
33. E.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935). 
34. 304 u.s. 64, 78 (1938). 
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2. One implication of institutional settlement, embodied in 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, is that once 
an issue is decided by fair procedures, the outcome is entitled to 
respect by other courts. In a dual judicial system like our own, 
this means that the courts of one sovereign should not reconsider 
issues resolved by another, or hear causes of action that could 
have been raised in the earlier proceeding,3s even if the case 
raises federal constitutional issues.36 
3. Litigants are expected to raise issues in accordance with 
the valid procedures of the court in which they find themselves. 
In order to enforce respect for those procedures, litigants who 
fail to do so will be precluded from raising them later on 
Supreme Court review of state judgments37 or in habeas corpus 
proceedings in federal district court.3s 
4. The problem of friction between federal and state courts 
arises when the litigants struggle over which system will decide 
an issue, as where one party brings suit in state court and the 
other then attempts to secure federal jurisdiction. The problem is 
dealt with by a general rule, set forth in the Anti-Injunction Act, 
that federal courts generally may not interfere with pending state 
cases,39 and by judge-made rules addressing contexts in which the 
statute does not apply.4o 
5. In the system of institutional settlement, courts are gen-
erally subordinate to Congress. This relationship is reflected in 
Article Ill of the Constitution, which gives Congress power over 
the creation and (by implication) the jurisdiction of federal 
courts.41 
35. Full Faith and Credit, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1989). 
36. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. Of Education, 465 U.S. 75 (1984); 
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). 
37. Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969). Editors of Hart & Wechsler have 
disagreed among themselves over how strict the procedural default rule should be. See 
Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 576-77 (cited in note 8). 
38. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
39. 28 u.s.c. § 2283 (1990). 
40. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
41. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). The proposition in the text is con-
tested by some scholars working within the Hart & Wechsler tradition. See, e.g., Akhil 
Reed Arnar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Ill: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal 
Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article Ill, 132 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1984). The founders themselves quarreled over whether Congress pos-
sesses untrarnrnelled power to restrict the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Corn-
pare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1364-65 (1953) (no) with Herbert 
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colurn. L. Rev. 1001, 1005-06 (1965) (yes). 
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6. Our system of institutional settlement, however, is not 
one of absolute legislative supremacy. Since Marbury v. 
Madison,4z judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative 
and executive action has been a part of it. There are at least two 
important implications of this principle for federal courts law. 
Congress may not evade judicial review by cutting off access to 
all courts for federal constitutional issues.43 The principle of fi-
nality is also limited by due process. If a state procedure does not 
provide a full and fair opportunity to raise federal issues, then 
litigants should have access to federal court to assert them.44 
7. Of course, it is better to avoid friction than to seek it 
out. Sometimes, courts will have to confront the majoritarian 
branches by deciding constitutional issues. But courts should, if 
possible, strive to resolve the case at hand on other grounds. Ac-
cordingly, federal courts should, if possible, resolve cases on non-
constitutional grounds. One justification for narrow review of 
state judgments, and for the standing, ripeness, and mootness 
doctrines, is that absent a pressing need to resolve a constitu-
tional issue, federal courts should decline to do so.4s 
8. It is implicit in the principle of institutional settlement 
that issues of federal law should be settled, and settled in the 
same way everywhere. The utilitarian justification for uniformity 
of national law is easy to appreciate, for a body of law cannot 
effectively realize its aims unless it speaks with one voice 
everywhere.46 
9. Another uncontroversial goal of the practice of institu-
tional settlement is achieving greater efficiency in the system of 
dispute resolution, through doctrines like supplemental jurisdic-
tion,47 which avoids piecemeal litigation, and the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, which normally yields a quick and unambiguous 
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
43. Cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (interpreting arguably ambiguous 
statute as permitting access in order to avoid the "serious constitutional question" that 
would arise if it were construed otherwise). 
44. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605,626 (1981); Michael G. Collins, The Right to Avoid Trial: Justi-
fying Federal Court Intervention into Ongoing State Court Proceedings, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 49 
(1987). 
45. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 346 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing techniques for avoiding constitutional issues). 
46. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983). 
47. Supplemental Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1996). See also United Mine Work-
ers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
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answer to the question of whether a case is within the federal 
question jurisdiction.4s 
II. SUBSTANTIVE THEMES IN FEDERAL 
COURTS LAW 
By the terms "substantive themes," "naked politics," and 
their variants, I mean to distinguish between the jurisdictional 
policies adumbrated above, on the one hand, and jurisdictional 
decisions motivated by a preference that one side or the other 
prevail on the merits of the litigation or gain a tactical advantage 
that may prove decisive in close cases. This is not at all the case 
when Federal Courts doctrines are based on jurisdictional policy. 
Though Federal Courts issues always arise in the course of litiga-
tion over substantive rights and duties, the central characteristic 
of jurisdictional policies is that they are not aimed at giving one 
side or the other an advantage in the litigation. Policies like uni-
formity, finality, efficiency, institutional competence, and avoid-
ing federal-state friction are trans-substantive, in that they apply 
across the whole range of substantive issues. Their aim is to facili-
tate law making and dispute resolution in our complex system of 
government, with its division of power between national and 
state governments and among three branches of the national 
government. 
Some Federal Courts decisions and statutes, however, can-
not plausibly be explained by jurisdictional policy alone. Con-
sider the doctrine stemming from Younger v. Harris.49 Younger 
itself merely holds that a federal court may not ordinarily enjoin 
a pending state criminal prosecution, even where the state de-
fendant/federal plaintiff raises a constitutional objection to the 
state case.so It may be defended as an uncontroversial application 
of the jurisdictional policy of avoiding friction between federal 
and state courts. But the Court has extended Younger to cover 
state civil and administrative proceedings, where the state inter-
est is presumably weaker.s1 Moore v. Simssz obliges litigants to 
remain in state court even where the federal issues are not de-
fenses but permissive counterclaims. Again, the anti-friction pol-
48. E.g., Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). See also Han 
& Wechsler Fourth at 910-11 (cited in note 8). 
49. 401 u.s. 37 (1971). 
50. Id. at 43-44. 
51. See Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 1300-08 (cited in note 8). 
52. 442 u.s. 415 (1979). 
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icy seems weak here. In Hicks v. Mirandas3 the Court applied 
Younger where the federal case was brought first, so that the pol-
icy of deference would seem to cut the other way. Doran v. Sa-
lem Inn, Inc. s4 can be read as requiring federal dismissal even 
where it is impossible to raise the federal issue in the state case. 
Fidelity to the jurisdictional policy of assuring access to the 
courts to raise constitutional claims would call for upholding fed-
eral jurisdiction.ss 
How, then, are these cases to be explained? The Court that 
crafted the Younger doctrine is noted for the general theme of 
pruning the growth of constitutional rights that flowered in the 
1960s. The effect of the Younger doctrine is to direct federal con-
stitutional claims to state courts. State courts are less likely to 
favor the constitutional claimant in close cases than are the fed-
eral courts, for reasons that will be explained shortly. Though the 
Supreme Court does not acknowledge it, the weakness of the ju-
risdictional policy arguments for cases like Hicks, Doran, and 
Moore suggest that the extension of Younger beyond its narrow 
holding is motivated largely by the Court's preference that the 
state get the advantage of a sympathetic forum in close constitu-
tional cases. 
As the Younger doctrine illustrates, the main avenue for 
manipulating jurisdictional doctrine toward substantive ends lies 
in the selection of rules for allocating cases between federal and 
state courts.s6 Federal and state courts are not fungible. They dif-
fer for a variety of reasons, including the judges' backgrounds, 
"psychological set," and methods of selection. Perhaps most im-
portant, Article III guarantees federal judges life tenure during 
good behavior, while many state judges must stand for election. 
Subject to majoritarian pressure, state courts tend to give more 
respect than do federal courts to the state's arguments in consti-
53. 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (holding that the federal court must defer so long as the 
state prosecution is brought before there have been "proceedings of substance on the 
merits" in federal court). 
54. 422 U.S. 922, 929-31 (1975) (holding that federal litigants who are not being 
prosecuted in state court may obtain preliminary injunctive relief in federal court, but 
that a litigant who is being prosecuted in state court may not obtain interim relief, even 
though the state court Jacks jurisdiction to grant such relief). 
55. See Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for 
Prospecti11e Relief, 1977 S. Ct. Rev. 193, 238. 
56. Other opportunities for manipulating jurisdictional doctrines toward substantive 
ends arise in connection with standing, Supreme Court review, the Eleventh Amendment, 
and federal common law. See Michael Wells, The Impact of Substantille Interests on the 
Law of Federal Courts, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 499, 504-10,520-40 (1989); Michael Wells, 
Rhetoric and Reality in the Law of Federal Courts: Professor Fallon's Faulty Premise, 6 
Const. Comm. 367, 378-80 (1989). 
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tutional cases.s7 The outcome of a close case, where there are 
open issues of law or difficult issues of fact,ss may turn on 
whether the case is assigned to state or federal court.s9 The sub-
stantive impact of allocation decisions could not be proven deci-
sively without controlled tests in which the same disputes are 
litigated in both fora. Yet the behavior of lawyers seems to vali-
date it. A glance at the federal and state case reporters will show 
that, given a choice, lawyers for persons with constitutional 
claims by and large prefer federal court.60 It is an open secret 
that lawyers make arguments based on jurisdictional policy when 
their real motive is to acquire a litigating edge.61 Nor could any 
judge fail to appreciate the substantive consequences of jurisdic-
tional decisions.62 
In short, there is "weak parity" between federal and state 
courts. By weak parity, I mean that state courts are sufficiently 
well-informed and well-intentioned to give claims of federal right 
a fair hearing, so that a litigant could not plausibly claim in the 
ordinary case that he was denied due process by state court adju-
57. Cf. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the 
Rule of Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 726-29 (1995) (arguing that, for this reason, elective 
judiciaries are constitutionally dubious). 
58. My premise here is that the legal materials do not yield answers to these close 
cases where the allocation decision matters and yet each forum is constitutionally ade-
quate. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Playing By the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of 
Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 34-37, 188-96 (Oxford U. Press, 1991); 
Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 352 (M. Knight trans., U. of California Press, 1967); 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 121-23 (Clarendon Press, 1961). Ronald Dworkin has 
argued that, in a sense, every case has a right answer. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously 81-130 (Duckworth & Co., 1977). Dworkin seems to agree, however, that it may 
be impossible to demonstrate with any confidence that one or another answer is right. See 
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire viii-ix (Belknap Press, 1986). 
Suppose Dworkin is correct in maintaining that there is a right answer to the substan-
tive issue, in that a judge of Herculean talent could find one. Perhaps one court is more 
likely to get to that right answer than the other. Even so, this possibility cannot provide a 
persuasive ground for preferring one court over the other. In these hard cases we do not 
know what the right answer is or how to arrive at it. The legal materials necessarily con-
tain no criteria by which to evaluate a court's claim that its allocation decision is really 
based on getting at the right answer. Accepting the "right answer" argument would effec-
tively foreclose any criticism that an allocation decision improperly rests on substantive 
grounds. For these reasons, I find it unacceptably facile to answer the charge that naked 
substance lies behind an allocation rule by claiming that the rule is really based on a 
presumption as to which court is more likely to arrive at the right answer. 
59. See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). 
Cf. Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judici-
ary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257, 281 
(1995) (empirical study of federal judges, showing that in close cases, but not the mass of 
cases, outcomes vary according to judicial background). 
60. See Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Ton 
Litigation, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 641, 655 n.72 (1987). 
61. See Neuborne, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1115-16 (cited in note 59). 
62. See Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 505-10 (cited in note 56). 
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dication. At the same time, state courts are not interchangeable 
with federal courts.63 In these circumstances, the opportunity is 
present for naked politics to influence jurisdictional decisions.64 
When it is not unfair to send a case to state court, the principle of 
assuring due process does not compel federal jurisdiction. Yet 
both sides have a strong incentive to argue for what may be de-
scribed as the home court advantage. Knowing that their jurisdic-
tional decisions may have substantive impact, judges will be 
tempted to take this into account in making them. In very gen-
eral terms, litigation over constitutional rights is a conflict be-
tween the substantive interests of persons seeking to limit state 
regulation of their activities, on the one hand, and the state's in-
terest in pursuing its regulatory interests free of judicial interfer-
ence, on the other. Judges who, in the main, favor constitutional 
claims, will be inclined to favor broad access to federal court, 
while judges whose substantive preferences lie with state inter-
ests in regulation may prefer to channel constitutional cases to 
state court. 
The Younger doctrine is not an isolated instance of raw sub-
stance influencing Federal Courts decisions. The significance of 
naked politics may be appreciated by noting the global move-
ments of Federal Courts law over the past forty years. Since the 
first edition of Hart & Wechsler, Federal Courts law has under-
gone a revolution and a counter-revolution. Under Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, the Court in the 1960s eased access to federal court 
for federal constitutional claims. Monroe v. Pape6s reinvigorated 
a ninety-year old civil rights statute, reading it as authorizing a 
federal cause of action to redress virtually any constitutional vio-
lation committed by a state officer. Dombrowski v. Pfister66 loos-
ened restrictions on federal injunctions against state proceedings. 
The Pullman abstention doctrine fell into disuse,67 once again 
63. See Burt Neubome, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 
44 DePaul L. Rev. 797, 797 & n. 3 (1995); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The 
Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 609, 
610-11 (1991). 
64. See generally Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (cited in note 56); Michael Wells, Is 
Disparity a Problem?, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 283, 296-324 (1988). 
65. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (federal suit to redress constitutional violations is ap-
propriate even where the state provides a remedy). 
66. 380 U.S. 479,489-92 (1965) (the state statute's overbreadth is sufficient justifica-
tion for making an exception to the rule against federal equitable intervention to stop a 
threatened state prosecution). 
67. Han & Wechsler Fourth at 1237 (cited in note 8). 
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strengthening access to federal court. In cases like Fay v. Noia68 
and Townsend v. Sain69 the Court made federal habeas corpus 
broadly available to persons convicted of crimes in state court. 
Baker v. Carr7o and Flast v. Cohenn lowered the "standing to 
sue" barrier to federal court access. The Eleventh Amendment's 
prohibition on federal suits against states appeared to be 
moribund. n 
When the composition of the Court began to change, so did 
the outcomes of Federal Courts issues. Dombrowski was eviscer-
ated in Younger v. Harris,73 a case the Court then used as the 
starting point for a sustained campaign of curbing access to fed-
eral court where a state forum was available to the federal plain-
tiff.74 Beginning with Wainwright v. Sykes7s the new Court 
dismantled the Warren Court's habeas regime step by step.76 Al-
len v. Wright77 and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State7B halted the Warren 
Court's erosion of standing restrictions. Michigan v. Long79 
boosted the conservative Court's power to review state court de-
cisions expanding federal rights, while Pennhurst State School 
68. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (federal habeas court may excuse a prisoner's proce-
dural default in state court unless the default reflects a "deliberate bypass" of state 
procedures). 
69. 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (authorizing federal fact-finding hearings in habeas in a 
broad array of circumstances). 
70. 369 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1962) (permitting voters to challenge legislative districting 
on the ground that disparities in the number of voters violate their rights to equal 
protection). 
71. 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (permitting taxpayers to challenge federal expenditure 
on establishment clause grounds). 
72. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (allowing monetary 
recovery against a state government as part of equitable relief, without discussing the 
Eleventh Amendment); Parden v. Terminal Railway, 3n U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (allowing 
monetary recovery against a state government on an ill-defined waiver theory). See also 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670 (1974) (discussing Shapiro). 
73. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
74. See Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 1291-1308 (cited in note 8). 
75. 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (procedural defaults will be excused on habeas only on 
a showing of "cause" and "prejudice"). An earlier case, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,481-
82 (1976) (no habeas for Fourth Amendment claims where the petitioner had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate them in state court), was a false start, having little impact 
outside its narrow holding. See Hart & Wechsler Founh at 1389 (cited in note 8). 
76. See text accompanying note 10. 
77. 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (setting strict standards of "traceability" and "redres-
sability" as barriers to standing). 
78. 454 U.S. 464,479-80 (1982) (denying taxpayer standing to challenge decisions by 
executive agencies). 
79. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983) (raising a presumption that ambiguous state court 
decisions are based on federal law). 
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and Hospital v. Haldermanso and Milliken v. Bradleys1 invoked 
the Eleventh Amendment to hinder federal court reform of state 
practices. 
No doubt a detailed analysis of all of the strands of doctrine 
at issue in these cases would show that each, standing alone, 
could plausibly be justified in terms of jurisdictional policy.82 But 
it is all too easy to miss the forest by looking solely at the trees. 
When one considers the body of cases as a whole, it is evident 
that the Court of the 1960s began from one set of premises, and 
the Court of the past twenty-five years from another.s3 The key 
variable is naked politics. The sole unifying theme throughout 
the past forty years of Federal Courts developments is that, by 
and large, the Court's jurisdictional program mirrored its sub-
stantive agenda.84 The Warren Court, favoring expansion of fed-
eral rights, sought to enhance their content not merely by rulings 
on the merits, but by extending access to federal court for their 
enforcement. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts tried to cut back 
the content of federal rights, not just by rulings on the merits, but 
also by precluding access to federal district courts and by ex-
tending its own power to review state decisions that may have 
expanded federal rights. 
Ann Althouse rightly warns against viewing Federal Courts 
as a "stark picture of ideological Justices using jurisdiction as a 
80. 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984) (the principle that federal courts may enjoin state offi-
cials does not extend to relief based on state law). 
81. 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (equitable relief may not be ordered against local gov-
ernment that did not commit a constitutional violation, even if such relief would be neces-
sary to remedy the violation committed by another local government of the same state). 
82. For example, the Warren Court habeas decisions were surely based, in part, on a 
well-founded fear that state courts, especially in the South, would not provide a fair forum 
for federal claims in the era of civil rights protests. See Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 1359-60 
(cited in note 8); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally 
Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State 
Court Trial, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 793 (1965). Nor do I doubt that the recent cutbacks reflect 
the current majority's respect for finality. But neither set of cases can satisfactorily be 
explained solely in terms of jurisdictional policies. Liberal justices and scholars continue 
to defend the Warren Court regime long after the premise of state court inadequacy has 
lost its force. By the same token, the current Court's barriers go well beyond what is 
needed to assure respect for finality. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., and Daniel J. Meltzer, 
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1796, 
1816-20 (1991). 
83. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev. 
1141, 1142-43, 1151-1202, 1215-24 (1988). 
84. See Wells, 6 Const. Comm. at 372-81 (cited in note 56). My article is a response 
to Fallon's explanation that the tensions in the case law result from competing "structures 
of thought" rather than "crudely political" conflict. Fallon, 74 Va. L. Rev. at 1147, 1149 
(cited in note 83 ). 
1997] WHO'S AFRAID OF HART? 189 
smokescreen for a political agenda."ss In arguing that substance 
accounts for many jurisdictional decisions, I do not mean to re-
duce the area to one in which naked politics decides every issue. 
The influence of substance resembles a gravitational force that, 
while invisible to the eye, pulls in one direction or another with-
out necessarily controlling the outcome of a given dispute. It 
must always compete with such formal considerations as the 
value of following rules laid down in precedents or statutes, 
though, as noted earlier, rule-based arguments tend to lack force 
in Federal Courts law. A more serious competitor is jurisdictional 
policy. The various jurisdictional policies may carry at least as 
much weight as naked politics, especially in cases where the sub-
stantive implications of ruling one way or the other are slight or 
uncertain. 
For example, in some situations institutional competence 
may favor the federal forum, even apart from concerns of basic 
fairness, simply because federal judges are more talented than 
state judges. As grounds for federal jurisdiction over federal tax 
and patent cases, this argument has merit. When the issues are 
constitutional questions bearing on civil rights and liberties, it 
seems more of a makeweight. These cases require no specialized 
knowledge; their intellectual challenges are within the grasp of 
the average lawyer. Given the importance of value choices in 
resolving hard constitutional questions,s6 partisans of federal ju-
risdiction are probably motivated more by a desire for a sympa-
thetic forum than by considerations of competence. 
Similarly, the policy of uniform federal law may favor fed-
eral courts. But the uniformity policy cannot plausibly justify 
broad access to federal court for constitutional claims. When 
Congress regards uniformity as important, it creates specialized 
federal courts, or at least imposes exclusive federal jurisdiction. 
Proponents of broad access to federal court in constitutional 
cases do not advance either of these proposals and rarely if ever 
rely on uniformity even as a makeweight. They typically seek to 
give litigants a choice between federal and state court. 
85. See Ann Althouse, Federal Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Federal Rights: 
Can_ Congress Bring Back the Warren Era?, 20 L. & Social Inquiry 1067, 1075-79 (1995) 
(reviewing Larry Yackle, Reclaiming the Federal Courts (1994)). 
86. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1246-47 (1987). 
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III. SUBSTANCE IN HART & WECHSLER 
Fallon, Meltzer and Shapiro include many references to the 
political settings in which Congress and the Supreme Court 
render jurisdictional decisions.87 Even so, it seems to me that the 
editors give substantive themes far less attention than they de-
serve. The paradox may be resolved by keeping in mind that 
some jurisdictional policies have significant political overtones. 
In particular, the goals of allocating jurisdiction on the basis of 
institutional competence and assuring a fair forum often require 
Congress or the Court to consider the political context. 
The editors go wrong by failing to draw the crucial distinc-
tion between "naked politics"-i.e., basing jurisdictional law on 
nothing more than a preference for the substantive interests of 
one side or the other-and the effort to realize the Legal Process 
aspirations of institutional competence and fair forums. These ju-
risdictional policies are discussed in the cases and in the notes, 
while "naked politics" is rarely mentioned and never elaborated. 
The effect, perhaps unintentional, may be to incline the trusting 
reader toward (mis)understanding the relationship between poli-
tics and Federal Courts law exclusively in terms of jurisdictional 
policy rather than raw substance. Alternatively, a suspicious 
reader unschooled in the subtleties of the naked substance/juris-
dictional policy distinction may too quickly dismiss the Court's 
proffered reasons. 
For example, the materials on procedural default suggest 
that inadequate state ground cases from the civil rights era may 
reflect "bend[ing] the jurisdictional rules to be able adequately to 
deal with a pressing set of social, legal and political problems."BB 
In the absence of some explicit discussion of naked politics as a 
possible ground for those decisions, the reader will be ill-
equipped to decide whether this is a reference to raw substance 
or to the jurisdictional policy of assuring litigants a fair forum. 
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine relaxes standing re-
quirements in free speech cases, but this is not necessarily ex-
87. In a letter commenting on a draft of this paper, Professor Meltzer told me that, 
as he sees it, a partial list of such substantive themes would include issues addressed in 
Han & Wechsler Fourth at pp. 35, 38, 74-76, 80, 85, 136-37, 139-40, 149-50, 172, 174, 208-
10, 265-69, 350, 351-54, 364, 452, 486, 536-38, 540, 542-43, 570, 576, 588 n.8, 604, 608-09, 
625, 639, 654, 758, 841-43, 875, 901, 911, 1082, 1121-22, 1212, 1233, 1267, 1268, 1356-59, 
1361, 1387, 1410, 1444, 1492, 1572-77, 1708, 1711, 1712-13, and 1713-14 (cited in note 8). 
Letter from Daniel Meltzer to Michael Wells, Aug. 9, 1996 (on file with author). 
88. Han & Wechsler Founh at 576-77 (cited in note 8). See also id. at 604 (on the 
scope of Supreme Court review of facts found by state courts); id. at 1268 (noting that 
Younger may be criticized for its failure to grant access to a "sympathetic" forum for the 
assertion of federal claims). 
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plained by naked politics. As the editors note, the conventional 
Legal Process account of the doctrine is that free speech is an 
especially fragile right requiring special solicitude.s9 The Court's 
reluctance to recognize standing to obtain "structural" injunc-
tions may be based on simple hostility to the substantive rights 
advanced in the cases, but it is discussed in the cases in terms of 
the Court's doubts about the institutional competence of federal 
courts to manage such relief and whether those doubts are 
justified.90 
In each of these areas, it may well be that the better explana-
tion of the Court's ruling is naked substance, unmoored from any 
jurisdictional policy. My point is that there is little in the 
casebook's treatment of doctrinal foundations that would invite 
the reader to draw that conclusion. Conversely, a cynical reader 
may jump to the unwarranted conclusion that naked substance 
lies behind decisions that are actually justified in terms of juris-
dictional policy. I believe, for example, that the civil rights-era 
inadequate state ground cases can be defended in such terms. By 
failing to distinguish between jurisdictional policy and raw poli-
tics, the editors miss an opportunity to improve the book. They 
could have enhanced our understanding by focusing the reader's 
attention on whether, and to what extent, contemporary Federal 
Courts law can be adequately explained in terms of the Hart & 
Wechsler paradigm and the jurisdictional policies that it 
embraces. 
There are, of course, exceptions to the book's general blur-
ring of the line between substance and jurisdictional policy. For 
example, the editors suggest that the liberal standing and ripe-
ness rulings in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study 
Group9I may "most plausibly [be] explained" on raw substantive 
grounds. Another example is the treatment of Michigan v. 
Long,92 and the cases that came after it, where the editors do 
89. Id. at 208-10. See also id. at 639 (on relaxing finality requirements in free speech 
cases). 
90. Id. at 265-70. See also id. at 1082 (Pennhurst may be motivated by the majority's 
dislike of structural relief). 
91. 438 U.S. 59, 72-82 (1978) (holding ripeness and standing requirements met for a 
dispute in which the injury had no relation to the claimed constitutional violation). See 
Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 150, 258 (cited in note 8). 
92. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). This case expanded the Supreme Court's power to review 
state judgments by holding that ambiguous state judgments would be presumed to rest on 
federal grounds. As I have explained elsewhere, the effect of the ruling is to permit the 
Court to review cases where the state court ruled in favor of the federal claimant. Hence, 
it favors the substantive interests of the state over those of constitutional claimants. See 
Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 523-27 (cited in note 56). In later cases, where applying 
the Long rule would have opened the federal courts to constitutional claimants, thus 
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name substance as a likely culprit for the Court's selective en-
forcement of its holding. An intriguing question in the notes sug-
gests a more systematic role for substance. The editors ask 
whether the Court's practice may "illustrate a general principle: 
jurisdictional rules tend to move in the direction of allowing 
more intensive supervision in areas of the law where the 
Supreme Court is in the process of changing the relevant sub-
stantive rules and wants to assure itself that the state courts are 
complying with the new dispensation[.]"93 The editors direct crit-
ical fire at other cases from the Burger and Rehnquist eras, but 
generally without openly suggesting that substance is the basis of 
the rulings.94 
Do these scattered references to substantive themes signal a 
break with the book's traditional focus on institutional compe-
tence, avoiding friction, efficiency, uniformity, and the like? 
There is still far too little explicit treatment of naked substance to 
justify drawing that conclusion. These references, though promis-
ing, seem to me to be better characterized as deviations from the 
jurisdictional policy norm that continues to dominate the selec-
tion and treatment of the materials, rather than as evidence of a 
commitment to a methodical exploration of naked politics in 
Federal Courts law. The current editors are, at best, equivocal in 
their stance toward substantive themes. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the editors' unwillingness to 
grasp the nettle is their treatment of federal-state parity. Com-
pared with its predecessors, and its current competitors, the 
fourth edition makes some progress in exploring the parity prob-
lem.9s The editors survey the debate over whether there is dis-
favoring their substantive interests, the Court has not always remained faithful to that 
rule. See Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 540-43 (cited in note 8). 
93. Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 542-43 (cited in note 8). Other examples of substan-
tive themes may include linking the "public rights model" of adjudication with "the sub-
stantive expansion of constitutional rights, especially under the Warren Court of the 
1960s," id. at 80; and identifying the substantive basis of some of Congress's restrictions 
on federal jurisdiction, id. at 364. 
94. See, e.g., id. at 140-41, 147-48, 172, 268-69, 1082, 1295-96, 1297-98, 1308, 1411, 
and 1440. 
95. See Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 715-16 (cited in note 7). Reviewing the third 
edition, Professor Amar noted that, though the third edition was better on parity than the 
previous two, "even it fail[ed] to develop the issue with the degree of care and precision 
that are the hallmarks of the book." I d. at 715. 
As for competing casebooks, some of them contain very brief discussions of parity, 
see, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Richard A. Matasar and Michael G. Collins, Federal Courts 
829-30 (Little, Brown & Co., 1996); Low and Jeffries, Federal Courts and the Law of 
Federal-State Relations at 210 (cited in note 13); Louise Weinberg, Federal Courts 277-78 
(West, 1994); Martin H. Redish and Gene R. Nichol, Federal Courts 688 (West, 3d ed. 
1994); Donald L. Doemberg and C. Keith Wingate, Federal Courts, Federalism and Sepa-
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parity between federal and state courts as an empirical question. 
But they quickly pass over the topic, failing to identify "weak 
parity" as an option, much less to address its substantive implica-
tions. As a result, they lack the means to provide complete expla-
nations of doctrinal developments. 
For example, they briefly contrast Warren Court habeas 
corpus doctrine with the restrictive habeas decisions of the Bur-
ger and Rehnquist Courts, pointing out that the latter "are seen 
as having a different substantive agenda-one that embraces 
greater reluctance to interfere with the state courts, and greater 
faith in their quality."% In the absence of some discussion of 
weak parity and naked substance, the reader is apt to conclude 
that the difference between the earlier and later periods is solely 
about jurisdictional policies of competence and fairness: The 
Warren Court questioned the "quality" of state judges, while its 
successors did not. 
The editors cite an empirical study that purported to show 
parity, and note criticisms of the study. But they do not explore 
the matter in any depth and make no independent evaluation of 
the issue, though the study itself seems to support weak parity 
rather than fungibility.97 They cite newspaper stories from 1991 
for the proposition that after years of Republican appointments 
to the federal bench, some constitutional litigants began to prefer 
state over federal court, but do not give any figures. They ignore 
statistics showing a steady rise in federal civil rights filings 
through the Bush administration.9s A survey of the advance 
sheets would reveal that far greater numbers of constitutional lit-
igants continue to prefer federal court. In any event, the newspa-
per stories cited in Hart & Wechsler Fourth are now somewhat 
dated after several years of Clinton appointments. The overall 
effect of the editors' treatment is to create the impression, un-
ration of Powers 635 (West, 1994); but none of these treatments are as good as Hart & 
Wechsler's. I can find no references to the parity issue in David P. Currie, Federal Courts 
(West, 1990) or in Charles T. McCormick, James H. Chadbourn and Charles Alan Wright, 
Federal Courts (Foundation Press, 9th ed. 1992). 
The best account of the parity problem may be found in a brand new casebook, H. 
Fink, et al., Federal Courts in the 21st Century 9-19 (Michie Law Publishers, 1996). 
96. Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 1361 (cited in note 8); see also id. at 1410. 
97. Id. at 351-53, citing Solimine and Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and 
State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 213 (1983) 
(finding that federal courts upheld constitutional claims 41% of the time, as opposed to 
32% for state courts). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role 
for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 261-69 (1988) (criticizing Solimine and 
Walker). 
98. See Theodore Eisenberg, Civil Rights Legislation 184-85 (Michie Co., 4th ed. 
1996). 
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warranted in my view, that there is room for doubt about the 
empirical question of whether parity does or does not exist. 
Much more space is devoted to "parity as a constitutional 
concept," the name the editors give to the issue of whether Arti-
cle III obliges Congress to provide a federal forum for review of 
federal issues.99 This, of course, is a doctrinal problem that fits 
neatly within the Hart & Wechsler terms of discourse. However 
it should be answered, one examines the legal materials and rea-
sons from them to a resolution. The editors are plainly more 
comfortable dealing with this kind of problem than with the real-
world parity issue. 
IV. HOW SUBSTANCE UNDERMINES THE HART & 
WECHSLER PARADIGM 
Why is substance given such short shrift in Hart & Wechsler? 
The editors do not say.1oo The answer cannot be that they are 
blind to its presence, for in their scholarship Professors Fallon 
and Meltzer recognize that substance influences Federal Courts 
doctrine.101 Perhaps the editors think naked politics warrants lit-
tle attention because it is of minor importance in explaining Fed-
eral Courts law. If substance influenced only an occasional case, 
it would have little impact on the utility of the Hart & Wechsler 
paradigm. No model explains everything; even theories of the 
physical world do not account for every observation. The social 
world is more unruly. Courts do err, and the "naked politics" 
cases could be understood as deviations from the norm. One 
point of a model, after all, is to provide a framework for analysis 
that will help identify the errors. 
This explanation for minimizing substance does not suffice. 
Over the past forty years, substance has dominated the major 
movements in Federal Courts doctrine, first in the Warren 
99. See Hart & Wechsler Fourth at 353-54, 373-79 (cited in note 8). 
100. The decision is all the more puzzling in that elsewhere Fallon has claimed that 
substance is fully compatible with the Hart & Wechsler paradigm. See Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Comparing Federal Courts "Paradigms," 12 Const. Comm. 3, 6-7 (1995). But it is un-
clear whether he means "naked" substance, as I define that term. See text at notes 47-48. 
As I argue in the paragraphs below, Fallon is mistaken if he thinks that naked substance 
can be reconciled with Hart & Wechsler. 
101. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 2507, 2511 n. 20 (1993) ("I do not doubt that people who seek to restrict 
habeas jurisdiction generally prefer more limited constitutional protections-or that, 
more generally, federalism arguments often mask substantive ends. [But substance should 
not necessarily be determinative.)"); Fallon, 12 Const. Comm. at 6 (cited in note 100) 
(asserting that "[n]o sensible partisan of the Hart & Wechsler paradigm thinks that 'juris-
dictional policy' could be as innocent of substantive concerns as [Wells) maintains that the 
paradigm demands"). 
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Court's expansions of access to federal court, and then in the 
conservative reaction that followed and continues to the present. 
Substantive themes cannot be dismissed as aberrations from the 
norm. Naked politics exercises decisive influence in decisions on 
standing, the Younger doctrine, habeas corpus, Supreme Court 
review of state judgments, and the Eleventh Amendment.toz 
A more likely explanation for the editors' equivocal stance 
toward naked substance is that recognizing a prominent role for 
substance in the casebook would undermine the whole enterprise 
of constructing Federal Courts law on Legal Process principles. 
Showing why this is so begins with an examination of the founda-
tions of Hart & Wechsler, which lie in the principle of institu-
tional settlement. In a sense, it is merely a boring necessity that 
some institution of government must lay down binding decrees 
on legal issues. But institutional settlement has a normative di-
mension as well as a descriptive one, and it is the normative as-
pect that Hart and Sacks emphasized at the outset of The Legal 
Process. Decisions reached by established procedures "ought to 
be accepted as binding."W3 They should be accepted because the 
alternative to these "regularized and peaceable means of deci-
sion" is "disintegrating resort to violence."t04 Since we must live 
together under conditions of interdependence if we are to satisfy 
our wants, we are all better off living in peace.tos 
Why do Hart and Sacks stress the value of institutional set-
tlement so heavily? The Legal Process was a response to Holmes 
and the Realist scholars of the early twentieth century, who 
showed that judges often do not mechanically deduce results 
from pre-existing legal rules, but exercise judgment to resolve is-
sues to which the legal materials offer no clear answer.106 The 
Realist critique suggested that law making may be nothing more 
than the outcome of a struggle between conflicting interests, un-
constrained by any transcendent standards of justice or fairness. 
It became an urgent priority among legal theorists to come up 
with a response to nihilism that could withstand intellectual scru-
102. See Wells, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 640-41 (cited in note 63); Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. at 519-40 (cited in note 56). 
103. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at 4 (cited in note 14) (emphasis added). 
104. ld. 
105. See id. at 1-2. 
106. See, e.g., Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 
"Hu~ch" in Judicial Decision, 14 Cornell L.Q. 274 (1929). See also Laura Kalman, Legal 
Realtsm at Yale, 1927-1960 at 223 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1986); G. Edward White, 
The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 
Va. L. Rev. 279, 280-91 (1973). 
196 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:175 
tiny.1o1 In addition, the Realist critique cast doubt on the legiti-
macy of judicial law making. Judges lack the imprimatur of 
election to a policy-making post, and now they were deprived of 
the pretense that they merely deduced results from the extant 
rules. How, if at all, could judicial creativity be justified?los 
After World War II, a number of scholars, including Henry 
Hart, Albert Sacks, and Herbert Wechsler, undertook to meet 
the challenges posed by Realism. Herein lies the genesis of The 
Legal Process, and the jurisprudential movement that we know 
by the name of the book. According to Legal Process scholars, 
the Realists were right in their claims that legal rules are indeter-
minate and that judges make law on the basis of social policy. 
But the Realists were wrong to think that judges merely impose 
their own policy preferences. Moreover, Legal Process scholars 
maintained that Realism does not imply nihilism. Accepting the 
Realist critique of formalism does not mean endorsing the view 
that law making is merely a matter of deciding whose selfish in-
terests will prevail. 
Institutional settlement is Hart & Sacks's primary response 
to the threat of nihilism posed by the Realists' debunking of for-
malism.lo9 They explain its importance in the most basic terms: If 
people are to achieve their aims in life, they must live together 
"under conditions of interdependence."no In order to do so, they 
"must obviously have a set of understandings or arrangements of 
some kind about the terms upon which they_ are doing so."111 
Their "substantive understandings," about proper conduct, "nec-
essarily imply the existence of what may be called constitutive or 
107. See Neil Duxbury, The Reinvention of American Legal Realism, 12 Legal Stud. 
137, 154 (1992). 
108. See Bruce Ackerman, Law and the Modern Mind by Jerome Frank, 103 Daeda-
lus 119, 123 (1974); Amar, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 693-94 (cited in note 7). 
109. Along with the principle of institutional settlement, Hart and Sacks maintained 
that judges are constrained in a variety of other ways from simply imposing their wills. 
According to The Legal Process, judges do not decide cases based on hunches or their 
personal preferences. Though legal rules do not and cannot cover every issue that may 
arise, the legal materials available to judges include not only rules but also "principles and 
policies" that "are used and useful as guides to the exercise of a trained and responsible 
discretion." Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at 143 (cited in note 14). Adjudication 
consists in the reasoned elaboration of the whole body of legal materials, including rules, 
principles, and policies, to the resolution of the issue at hand. In statutory cases, judges 
are not put to a choice between reading the statute literally and doing with it what they 
please. Rather, they should and do strive to discern the purposes of the legislation and to 
implement them. See William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, An Historical and Critical In-
troduction to The Legal Process, in Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at xci-xcvi (cited in 
note 14). 
110. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at 3 (cited in note 14). 
111. Id. 
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procedural understandings or arrangements about how questions 
in connection with arrangements of both types are to be set-
tled. "uz These arrangements, which determine which institutions 
are to settle particular questions, "are obviously more fundamen-
tal than the substantive arrangements ... since they are at once 
the source of the substantive arrangements and the indispensable 
means of making them work effectively."113 
For Hart and his colleagues, the legal process, with institu-
tional settlement at its base, saves us from nihilism. Debates over 
substantive issues may well pit the narrow interests of one group 
against another. Even so, the process of making and applying law 
is not a morally empty realm in which the strong or devious pre-
vail and the weak and innocent must submit. The legal process 
has a moral value of its own, independent of substantive out-
comes.l14 Decisions by courts and legislatures deserve general re-
spect, even from the losers, because they are the product of 
"regularized and peaceable means of decision" rather than resort 
to naked force. Just as the alternative to setting up legal institu-
tions and legal process is "disintegrating resort to violence," so 
also "defiance of institutional settlements touches on or may 
touch the very foundations of civil order, and ... without civil 
order, morality and justice in anybody's view of them are 
impossible. "11s 
The normative value of institutional settlement has an im-
portant corollary: An institutional system may be more or less 
worthy of our respect. Though we should accept the outcomes of 
duly authorized procedures "unless and until they are duly 
changed,"u6 we are not obliged to accept blindly just any system 
of institutional settlement. Rather, "[t]he lawyer's business in any 
given institutional system is to help in seeing that the principle of 
institutional settlement operates not merely as a principle of ne-
cessity but as a principle of justice."u7 It is plain from the context 
that Hart and Sacks mean that the institutional system should 
aspire to operate as a principle of procedural justice. Our aim 
should be the "constant improvement" of our procedures "in the 
effort to assure that they yield decisions which are not merely 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 3-4. 
114. See Paul A. Freund, Henry M. Hart, Jr.: In Memorium, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1595, 
15% (1969) (Hart "saw the integrity and fitness of the legal process as a kind of transcen-
dent natural law, a law above laws, ... reminding us that there is indeed a morality of 
morality"). 
115. Hart & Sacks, The Legal Process at 109 (cited in note 14). 
116. Id. at 4. 
117. Id. at 6. 
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preferable to the chaos of no decision but are calculated as well 
as may be affirmatively to advance the larger purposes of the 
society. "us 
For the jurisdictional system to make a plausible claim to 
general allegiance, it must be constructed as though we were be-
hind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.u9 If we are to give due regard 
to everyone's substantive preferences, the procedural system 
must not favor any set of substantive outcomes. Once inadequate 
or unfair procedures are eliminated, substance should play no 
role in allocating jurisdiction, though of course the ultimate end 
is to achieve the best set of substantive outcomes in a "long term 
and aggregate sense. "12o 
Understanding the normative dimension of institutional set-
tlement enables us to make important and subtle distinctions be-
tween ostensibly similar rationales for federal jurisdiction. Take 
the difference between sympathy and fairness. Under Hart's 
model the inadequacy or unfairness of a state forum is a valid 
basis for access to federal court, while the greater likelihood that 
a federal judge will look kindly upon federal claims is not. Sym-
pathy is an euphemism for giving the plaintiff a substantive ad-
vantage, and institutional settlement cannot be "a principle of 
justice" if substance is permitted to influence the procedures for 
deciding substantive issues. The whole point of institutional set-
tlement is to provide a disinterested means for settling substan-
tive disputes, such that, whatever our views of substantive rights 
and duties, we can fairly be asked to accept the substantive out-
comes the system produces. As Fallon puts it, 
118. Id. 
119. Cf. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136-42 (Harvard U. Press, 1971) (maintaining 
that persons would reach a just social contract if they were deprived of information about 
"how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to 
evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations"). According to Rawls, 
"[t]he veil of ignorance makes possible a unanimous choice of a particular conception of 
justice." Id. at 140. Unanimity is important, because "[i]t enables us to say of the pre-
ferred conception of justice that it represents a genuine reconciliation of interests." Id. at 
142. 
I do not mean to conscript Rawls onto Hart's team. His topic is political philosophy, 
not federal jurisdiction. The differences may be important. All the same, I do think that 
the analogy is an apt one. 
120. Fallon, 12 Const. Comm. at 7-8 (cited in note 100). In this attenuated sense, 
"substance" does have a role in Federal Courts law under the Hart & Wechsler paradigm. 
Hart and Sacks's utilitarian view of the goals of the legal system sets as the ultimate aim 
of jurisdictional law, and of all law, the creation of the body of substantive law that will 
best permit human beings to live the good life. At the same time, basing jurisdictional law 
on naked politics is out of order. The point of Hart & Wechsler is that jurisdictional rules 
should not be based on the substantive interests of the parties, but on jurisdictional poli-
cies that will guide us toward an effective system of law making and dispute resolution. 
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In a post-Realist world, legal norms are frequently indetermi-
nate. Moreover, in a demonstrably pluralistic society, we can-
not expect consensus about appropriate answers to many 
urgent questions of substantive justice. But most of us, Hart & 
Wechsler assume, are prepared to accept the claim to legiti-
macy of thoughtful, unbiased decisions by government officials 
who are reasonably empowered to make such decisions. On 
this assumption rest our hopes for the rule of law.121 
199 
Deciding allocation issues on the basis of sympathy amounts to 
allowing one side to the substantive dispute to gain an advantage 
by imposing jurisdictional rules that favor its substantive inter-
ests, rigging the game as it were. In that event, the loser cannot 
fairly be expected to accept the legitimacy of the outcome.122 
Using substance to decide allocation issues undercuts the norma-
tive value of the principle of institutional settlement. Federal 
Courts law can no longer serve as an answer to Realist-inspired 
skepticism about the legitimacy of adjudication. 
V. WHY SUBSTANCE BELONGS IN FEDERAL 
COURTS CASEBOOKS 
Given the references to political context that do appear in 
Hart & Wechsler Fourth, it may be a bit unfair to take Fallon, 
Meltzer and Shapiro to task for their failure to pay more atten-
tion to naked substance. At the same time, there is something to 
be said for holding the leading book in the field to a high stan-
dard. It is, after all, the example that others follow. In any event, 
though I use the fourth edition as a convenient target, my main 
aim is not to single it out for criticism, but to make a broader 
point about the methodology of Federal Courts casebooks and 
scholarship: At present, substance receives only rudimentary at-
121. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at %4 (cited in note 9). 
122. This emphasis on designing legal institutions with the aim of achieving broad 
agreement on the fairness, if not the content, of the outcomes they produce is a central 
Legal Process theme. Besides the principle of institutional settlement, its influence may 
be seen in Hart's critique of Supreme Court opinion writing for failure to reflect "(the] 
life principle" that "reason is the life of the law and not just votes for your side," Henry 
Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. 
L. Rev. 84, 125 (1959); in Wechsler's caJI for constitutional decisions based on "grounds of 
adequate neutrality and generality, tested not only by the instant application but by 
others that the principles imply," H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law 
21 (Harvard U. Press, 1%1); and in Lon Fuller's insistence that adjudication is an appro-
priate process only for "bipolar" disputes in which each of two contending parties ad-
vances arguments based on legal materials and the task of the judge, cast as a neutral 
a:biter, is ~imply to choose between them rather than exercise broad discretion to impose 
h1s own will, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 
353, 365, 370-71, 394-95 (1978). 
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tention from Federal Courts scholars, including, but by no means 
limited to, Fallon, Meltzer and Shapiro. In my view, the tension 
between institutional settlement and unadorned substance ought 
to be a central theme of Federal Courts law, one that is examined 
in the systematic and explicit way that is currently reserved for 
doctrinal matters. 
Whether to include substantive themes in the Federal Courts 
casebook depends on a judgment of the costs and benefits of do-
ing so. The first answer an editor is likely to give against putting 
something in his casebook is that there is not room for it. But 
that response would carry little weight here. In terms of space, 
adding substance to the casebook is just a matter of including a 
few extra questions and notes here and there. If the editors are 
worried about space, I could suggest any number of topics that 
might be omitted or abbreviated for the sake of including sub-
stance. For example, the twelve pages devoted to the distinction, 
under pre-1988 law, between mandatory and discretionary 
Supreme Court review of state judgmentst23 might be reduced, 
since it is now "of merely historical interest."t24 Students need no 
instruction in the substantive themes that affect Federal Courts 
law, for most will have already taken Constitutional Law and 
Criminal Procedure. Many will grasp the substantive themes 
quickly; they are evident to anyone willing to look for them. 
But including substance is costly in other ways. Since sub-
stance subverts the Hart & Wechsler project, putting it in the 
book amounts to abandoning, or at least modifying, the Legal 
Process's project of making Federal Courts law a bulwark against 
nihilism. Bringing substance into the discussion of Federal Courts 
doctrine in a systematic way would require the editors to sacrifice 
the notion that Federal Courts law is strictly a body of trans-sub-
stantive law designed to mediate among conflicting political in-
terests toward the end of maximizing the social good. If we value 
Hart & Wechsler's aims highly enough, as the editors evidently 
do, then perhaps it is best to continue to minimize the role of 
substance in the book. But the value of those aims depends in 
part on how likely they are to prevail in the real world. Fallon 
understands that, for better or worse, Henry Hart's ideals no 
longer have as much currency as they once did, at least not 
outside the circle of Hart & Wechsler acolytes.12s However realis-
123. Han & Wechsler Founh at 644-56 (cited in note 8). 
124. ld. at 644. Nor is it clear to me why the Nonhern Pipeline case gets 16 pages, id. 
at 399-416, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n another eight, id. at 422-30, given 
that the issues in the two cases are similar, though the results diverge. 
125. Fallon, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 971 (cited in note 9). 
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tic it may have been in 1953 to think that we could achieve con-
sensus, it is plain today that ideological conflict is inescapable in 
public law, at least for the time being.126 The instability in Fed-
eral Courts law over the past forty years shows that either side 
will exploit the opportunities afforded by jurisdictional law to 
promote its substantive agenda. Given that Hart's aspirations 
probably will not be realized in any event, compromising them 
may be a small price to pay for the greater realism that more 
attention to substance would bring to Federal Courts casebooks. 
Perhaps I am too skeptical about the chance that Legal Pro-
cess aspirations can be realized. Because I share many Legal Pro-
cess ideals, I would like to think that Hart's project can succeed, 
at least partly, in spite of the beating it has taken in recent de-
cades. But this cannot happen unless scholars and students take 
seriously the normative issues underpinning Hart & Wechsler. At 
present, they are not invited to do so. Federal Courts students 
and scholars receive the unspoken message that the doctrine is 
supposed to be aimed at a body of law based on jurisdictional 
policy, a message that rests, in turn, on an implicit normative 
judgment that it is wrong to base jurisdictional law on naked sub-
stance. They are evidently expected to accept this as a given, for 
the book's fragmentary treatment of politics denies them the op-
portunity to debate the proposition that institutional settlement 
is a more valuable goal than pursuing a substantive agenda by 
jurisdictional means. In fact, the principle of institutional settle-
ment is never mentioned in Hart & Wechsler. 
Legal Process goals would be better served by bringing the 
principle of institutional settlement into the casebook, noting the 
conflict between it and the substantive themes that threaten it, 
and presenting arguments on all sides. Instead of taking the value 
of institutional settlement for granted, the leading casebook in 
the field should question its own premises. This would entail a 
basic shift in methodology. Rather than taking the principle of 
institutional settlement as the premise of Federal Courts law, and 
always attempting to solve jurisdictional issues by reference to 
jurisdictional policy, scholars would have to eschew the whole ef-
fort to build Federal Courts law on a foundation. We need to 
take a more pragmatic view of the area, acknowledging that ju-
risdictional policies may be overridden by raw politics, and un-
126. .see Eskridge and Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal 
Process, m Hart & Sacks: The Legal Process at cxviii-cxxv (cited in note 14); Wells, 71 
B.U. L. Rev. at 629-36 (etted in note 63). 
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derstanding that the value of institutional settlement may not 
carry the day against a substantive agenda in a given context. 
Suppose that substance is indeed an illegitimate ground for 
allocation decisions. Nonetheless, it exerts palpable influence. Ig-
noring it is hardly the way to fight it. If the Legal Process project 
is to be revived, students must be given a chance to appreciate its 
value. When the normative issue is made explicit and students 
are obliged to confront the choice between institutional settle-
ment and substantive aims, they may leave the course with a bet-
ter understanding of the value of institutional settlement and a 
stronger commitment to it. If they do not, the battle is lost any-
way. It is better to face that possibility than to shrink from it. By 
declining to debate the normative foundations of Federal Courts 
law, Hart & Wechsler's editors commit a distressingly familiar er-
ror. The strongest point Critical Legal Studies has made against 
traditional scholarship is the failure of scholars in the Legal Pro-
cess tradition to identify and defend their premises.121 
Normative debate is needed not only on the threshold ques-
tion of whether institutional settlement may be compromised in 
favor of substantive themes, but also on narrower doctrinal ques-
tions. Take it as given that, right or wrong, the Supreme Court 
long ago abandoned absolute fidelity to institutional settlement 
in favor of using Federal Courts law to pursue a variety of sub-
stantive goals. A host of questions, left unaddressed in Hart & 
Wechsler, arise: How is the value of institutional settlement to be 
measured against substantive goals in a given context? Are some 
jurisdictional policies strong enough to overcome substantive 
aims, while others are not? Are some substantive aims stronger 
than others? What contextual circumstances favor jurisdictional 
policy and which favor substance? 
For example, respect for the integrity of state enforcement 
proceedings seems to be an especially important jurisdictional 
policy, so that, as Paul Bator noted, "[i]t is ... not only not 
surprising but ... virtually inevitable that" neither Congress nor 
the Supreme Court has permitted removal of whole cases from 
state to federal courts based on a federal defense, except in ex-
traordinary circumstances.tzs Even prudent liberals agree.129 On 
127. See G. Edward White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 
649, 661-70 (1984); Joseph Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 465, 518-19 (1988) 
(reviewing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960 (1986)); Robert W. Gordon, 
New Developments in Legal Theory, in The Politics of Law 414-16 (Pantheon Books, rev. 
ed. 1990}. 
128. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 
Wrn. & Mary L. Rev. 605, 611-12 (1981}. 
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the other hand, avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions 
evidently has little force in contemporary Federal Courts law. 
Twice the Burger Court overrode the avoidance policy in order 
to pursue substantive aims.13o As for the varying importance of 
substantive rights, the Warren Court's expansion of habeas 
corpus suggests that the Court considered sympathetic enforce-
ment of constitutional rights of criminal procedure a sufficiently 
strong substantive aim to overcome the finality policy. First 
Amendment rights have often received especially solicitous 
treatment in jurisdictional law. By contrast, the constitutional 
rights of taxpayers get less respect.m Are these distinctions ap-
propriate? In order to articulate questions like this, one must 
step outside the Hart & Wechsler paradigm. 
The case for including naked substance is equally strong 
when it is put on descriptive grounds. Fallon notes that "the Hart 
& Wechsler paradigm reflects an insider's largely internalized 
standards of what is sayable and unsayable, relevant and irrele-
vant, persuasive and unpersuasive in legal argument about Fed-
eral Courts issues. "132 Substance should be minimized because 
the "paradigm's principal function is not to predict outcomes, but 
to suggest, invoke, and elucidate some of the norms that help to 
constitute legal argument about Federal Courts issues." In addi-
tion, it "serves an important pedagogical function of imbuing stu-
dents with some constitutive conventions of legal argument."t33 
Since the Court does not deploy substantive arguments, they are 
not among those norms and conventions, and need not be ex-
amined in a systematic way. Judging from the evidence offered 
by the fourth edition, Fallon and his co-editors remain uncertain 
as to just how much attention should be devoted to substance, 
and are especially wary of exploring the subversive implications 
of "weak parity."t34 
129. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1569, 1631-32 (1990). 
130. See Wells, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 520-27 (cited in note 56) (discussing Pen-
nhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman and Michigan v. Long). 
131. Compare Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (recognizing taxpayer standing to 
challenge Congressional expenditure on establishment clause grounds), and the Court's 
special "willing[ness] to relax finality requirements in order to protect speech interests 
against the erosion that can attend delay," Han & Wechsler Fourth at 639 (cited in note 
8), with the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, and Fair Assessment in Real Estate 
Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), which bar litigants challenging state taxes 
from federal district court so long as an adequate remedy is available in state court. 
132. Fallon, 12 Const. Comm. at 10 (cited in note 100). 
133. Id. at 12. 
134. See text at notes 87-99. 
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This justification for privileging jurisdictional policy over 
substance is hardly compelling. Let us grant that one aim of a 
casebook is to describe the norms and conventions of legal argu-
ment. A casebook, especially a casebook that defines the field 
and sets the scholarly agenda, should do more than that. It ought 
to portray the reality of what courts do. Since substantive themes 
influence much of Federal Courts law, students should be taught 
about that influence, and scholars should examine those themes. 
A casebook should permit students and scholars not only to ap-
preciate the internal logic of legal argument, but also to stand 
outside the doctrine and appraise it free of commitments to the 
Court's conventions. Students benefit from learning not only the 
conventions of argument but also the real forces that lie behind 
the Court's pieties. Scholars should explore those forces and 
their implications rather than trying to analyze problems within a 
model that is not fully adequate to the task,t3s 
Fallon concedes that Hart & Wechsler is "by no means a 
unique perspective," defending it nonetheless as "one view of the 
cathedral," that is "capable of generating genuine insights."l36 
But showing that the Hart & Wechsler paradigm has value is 
hardly a sufficient defense of the editors' decision to continue to 
build the casebook around it. Permit me to draw an analogy: 
every navigator knows that geocentric astronomy has its uses 
even after Copemicus.137 Yet its practitioners are not likely to 
obtain appointments in modem astronomy departments. In de-
ciding whether to adopt Legal Process principles as their frame-
work, the editors of the leading casebook in the field ought not 
to content themselves with a model that yields "genuine in-
sights." They should ask whether they could do better. If a differ-
ent framework would generate a more sophisticated 
135. I concede that neither side to a dispute about Federal Courts issues is likely to 
find it useful to publicly advance unadorned arguments based on substance. Nor are 
judges, whatever their politics, likely to invoke substance in support of their positions on 
Federal Courts issues. This, in itself, is an interesting feature of Federal Courts discourse. 
The general rejection of such arguments may reflect the normative allure of institutional 
settlement. The reason why neither side considers naked politics to be a congenial argu-
ment is that we all prefer to present ourselves to the world as persons who pursue the 
public good, and arguments based on litigation advantage and the like cast some doubt on 
that image. See Wells, 29 Ga. L. Rev. at 283-86 (cited in note 18). Casting their argu-
ments in terms of jurisdictional policy, while pursuing substantive ends, allows the dispu-
tants to avoid choosing between the two, and hence to have their cake and eat it, too, so 
to speak. 
136. Fallon, 12 Canst. Comm. at 12 (cited in note 100). 
137. See Thomas Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution; Planetary Astronomy in the De-
velopment of Western Thought 38, 58 (Harvard U. Press, 1957). 
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understanding and a more penetrating analysis, it ought to be 
preferred. 
So far as I can tell, Fallon and his co-editors have not under-
taken any such inquiry. In my view, a fair comparison of an ap-
proach that includes substance against the Hart & Wechsler 
approach would favor the former as an explanatory tool. Recall, 
for example, the earlier discussion of the turbulence of modern 
Federal Courts law. Nothing in the realm of jurisdictional policy 
can fully account for the Warren Court's jurisdictional revolution 
in habeas corpus, standing, and access to federal injunctive relief. 
Nor can jurisdictional policy by itself provide a plausible reason 
for the Rehnquist Court's assault on the habeas regime and the 
growth of the Younger doctrine. If it is true, as Fallon asserts, that 
Legal Process scholars "are quite adept at predicting judicial out-
comes,"I3s the reason is that, for all their obeisance to the Legal 
Process catechism, they fully grasp the lessons of Realism. 
While including substance in the casebook would compro-
mise some Legal Process ideals, it would serve another ideal-
that of candor. A tenet of the Legal Process is that candor is a 
requisite of legitimacy in adjudication. According to David Sha-
piro, "candor is the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse 
of judicial power," since "judges who regard themselves as free 
to distort or misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the 
sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest disclosure of 
their motivation may entail. "139 Given the ubiquity of substance 
in Federal Courts law, the Supreme Court should be called to 
account for it. One function of legal scholarship is "sustained, 
disinterested, and competent criticism of the professional quality 
of the Court's opinions."I4o ·Attention to substantive themes by 
the leading casebook in the field would be an effective way of 
calling the Court's attention to the need for more candor about 
naked politics in Federal Courts law. Excluding substance not 
only shortchanges students, but also gives the Court a free 
ride.I41 
Besides concealing some of the reasons for its decisions, the 
Supreme Court's lack of candor, and Hart & Wechsler's passive 
138. Fallon, 12 Const. Comm. at 12 (cited in note 100). 
139. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731, 737 
(1987). 
140. Hart, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 125 (cited in note 122). 
141. On this point I may be at odds with Ann Althouse, who is "afraid that open 
acknowledgement of the political nature of jurisdictional choices will have the unwanted 
consequence of undermining the legitimacy of any judicial rights-enforcing agenda." Alt-
house, 20 L. & Social Inquiry at 1081 (cited in note 85). I doubt whether the legitimacy 
Althouse seeks is attainable in the absence of candor. 
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complicity in it, has unfortunate implications for modem Federal 
Courts scholarship. Since Hart & Wechsler dominates the field, 
scholars view it as the only game in town, and feel constrained to 
make their arguments in the vocabulary of the paradigm. Yet 
many contemporary Federal Courts scholars object to the 
Court's rulings on grounds that are more correctly characterized 
as substantive. They respond to this dilemma in diverse ways, 
none of which is satisfactory. Fallon, for example, vainly tries to 
expand the paradigm in a way that would subvert its purpose, 
insisting that the Hart & Wechsler canon permits the allocation 
of cases to federal courts because they are more likely to sympa-
thize with federal claims.142 Erwin Chemerinsky tries to justify 
access to federal court in terms of litigant choice, without making 
a judgment on parity.143 Having constrained himself in this way, 
he cannot adequately explain why the preference of the party 
seeking federal access ought to prevail over that of his adver-
sary.144 Martin Redish145 and Akhil Amar146 try to escape the 
Hart & Wechsler trap by resort to formal arguments based on 
Article III and section 1983. Their efforts, too, fall short, mainly 
because formal arguments generally lack persuasive force in Fed-
eral Courts law.147 In each case the critique would pack more 
punch if it were straightforwardly framed in substantive terms.148 
142. See Fallon, 12 Const. Comm. at 7 (cited in note 100), where Fallon lumps to-
gether fairness and sympathy: "Can contemporary federal courts implement section 1983 
without weighing the extent to which state courts and agencies are likely to provide fair 
and sympathetic fora for the vindication of federal rights? Although others might disa-
gree, I do not think so." As noted earlier, confiating the two is a mistake, because fair-
ness is a jurisdictional policy within the Hart & Wechsler paradigm, while sympathy is an 
euphemism for naked politics. See text at notes 120-22. 
143. See Chemerinsky, 36 UCLA L. Rev. at 236-37 (cited in note 97). 
144. See Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: 
A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 329, 339-
42 (1988). See also Richard A. Matasar, Treatise Writing and Federal Jurisdiction Scholar-
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CONCLUSION 
One might be forgiven for wondering if the decision by Fal-
lon, Meltzer and Shapiro to stick with the Hart & Wechsler para-
digm could withstand a dispassionate evaluation of its advantages 
and demerits. I suspect that one reason the editors remain faith-
ful to Hart & Wechsler is simple (and admirable) loyalty to great 
men who made immense contributions to the field. Another may 
be intellectual conservatism of the sort that kept the Ptolemaic 
astronomers in business for many decades after Copernicus:I49 so 
long as the book remains the leader in the field, neither the edi-
tors nor the publisher see any compelling reason to change it. 
Decades of inbreeding among the Federal Courts elite may con-
tribute to the problem. Nearly everything that Federal Courts 
scholars learn about the area comes from Henry Hart, Herbert 
Wechsler, and their students.1so Their reluctance to admit troub-
ling ideas into the canon may be explained in terms of their so-
cialization into the ways of the tribe. Theorists of the sociology of 
knowledge teach that people trained in the values and beliefs of 
a group tend to take these to be true, ignoring, marginalizing, or 
rationalizing anything to the contrary.1s1 Finally, the very nobility 
of the Hart & Wechsler pedigree is itself an obstacle to change. A 
danger of working within a great tradition is that the editors, and 
Federal Courts scholars who follow their lead, may have invested 
too much intellectual capital in its success. Complacency may 
have set in, and with it a reluctance to challenge ways of thinking 
to which they have become accustomed. 
the well-pleaded complaint rule be abandoned, id. at 100-04, 114; that defendants in state 
civil cases be permitted to remove the litigation to federal court based on a federal de-
fense or counterclaim, id. at 116-18; and that the Younger doctrine be abolished for facial 
challenges to state statutes, id. at 144-48. 
I would like to see similar treatments of Federal Courts law written from a conserva-
tive perspective. My aim is to change (and, I hope, reinvigorate) the terms of the debate 
over federal jurisdiction rather than to promote one or another doctrinal regime. 
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